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ARTICLE
A Mindful Environmental Jurisprudence?:
Speculations on the Application of Gandhi’s
Thought to MCWC v. Nestlé
NEHAL A. PATEL & LAUREN VELLA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Gandhi’s life and thought captured the imaginations of
millions of people around the world. His influence on civil
disobedience campaigns and many social movements is well
known. He is best known for his application of non-violence to
political and social conflict, particularly in the context of
oppressed people resisting the will of an oppressor. What is less
often acknowledged, however, is Gandhi’s persistent attempt to
create a comprehensive vision of the world that challenged both
empirical and normative assumptions of modern institutions. His
eclectic blending of Indian philosophy, Buddhism, world
mysticism, and Western social theory created a way of viewing
self and society in such a way that functioned as an alternative to
Western-only world views for the future of the planet and our
species. It is no wonder, therefore, that Gandhi has functioned as
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an intellectual ally for many alternative critical thinkers over the
past century, especially those who themselves have challenged
oppressive social conditions.
Given the revered status that so many attribute to him, it
would be easy to assume that Gandhi has had a profound
influence on dominant ways of thinking in law and jurisprudence.
However, although Gandhi had much to say–and do–on these
topics, his largest influences remain within the social movements
of oppressed peoples as well as in counter-cultural movements.
His thought today still exists on the margins of academic social
theory, despite the fact that his name often is celebrated publicly
by dignitaries around the world.
In particular, Gandhi’s impact on jurisprudence is negligible.
There is virtually no academic scholarship that speculates on a
Gandhi-informed jurisprudence. This is intriguing, given that
Gandhi spent most of his adult life publicly challenging existing
laws and filled hundreds of pages of commentary on people’s
relationship to law. He inquisitively examined people’s duties to
both obey and resist laws.
Yet, strangely, jurisprudential
scholars overwhelmingly are silent on the question of how to
engage Gandhi. He remains more of an admired figurehead of
peace and non-violence rather than a serious source of legal
theory in the mainstream of modern jurisprudence.
We attempt to engage modern legal reasoning with Gandhi’s
thought. We hope to speculate on what jurisprudence would look
like if it were more mindful of the concepts central to Gandhi’s
thought. By using Gandhi as an intellectual anchor, we hope to
take a step toward creating a more “mindful jurisprudence” that
implicitly incorporates into its reasoning the needs of
environmental stewardship, disempowered populations, and the
poverty-stricken. Because Gandhi’s thought has been discussed
at length in environmental justice campaigns, we begin this effort
by examining the relationship between environmental law and
Gandhi’s thought. Given Gandhi’s commentaries on exploitative
and oppressive social relationships, we focus on the intersections
of law, environment, and economy.
We use the recent suit, Michigan Citizens for Water
Conservation v. Nestlé Waters North America, Inc. (MCWC), as a
case study to which we apply themes from Gandhi’s thought.
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Applying Gandhi’s thought to MCWC is useful for two reasons.
First, MCWC contains several core legal doctrines that appear
regularly in environmental cases (and in case law more broadly).1
As a result, our applications of Gandhi’s thought directly apply to
other environmental cases.
Second, the case involves a
defendant-corporation’s encroachment onto a stream used by local
Environmental justice campaigns often
plaintiff-civilians.2
involve similar factual circumstances in which local people resist
large outsider organizations.3 Therefore, using Gandhi’s thought,
we examine the legal reasoning in MCWC to identify taken-forgranted assumptions about environment and society that favor
outside parties over local residents.
A. Gandhi’s Influence on Environmental Thought
In the domain of environmental thought, Gandhi did not
focus purely on parts of the physical environment such as wildlife
or natural resources.4
Instead, Gandhi understood
environmental problems through an emphasis on social
relations.5 Therefore, to understand the implications of Gandhi’s
view of environmental problems, it is important to understand his
view of society. We can explicate his world-view by examining his
writings.
Gandhi did not strive to write any complete treatise on his
thought because he was concerned about addressing immediate

1. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am.,
Inc. (MCWC), 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007), overruled by Lansing Sch. Educ.
Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996) (water contamination in
Woburn, MA); A Brief Introduction to the Narmada Issue, FRIENDS OF THE RIVER
NARMADA, http://www.narmada.org/introduction.html (last visited Mar. 18,
2013) (discussing efforts against building a dam along the Narmada River); THE
CORPORATION (Zeitgeist Films 1996) (water privatization in Bolivia involving
Bechtel Corporation).
4. See Ramachandra Guha, Mahatma Gandhi and the Environmental
Movement in India, in ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS IN ASIA 65, 114 (1998).
5. In this sense, Gandhi seems akin to many schools of environmental
sociology. See ALLAN SCHNAIBERG, THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM SURPLUS TO
SCARCITY (1980).
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problems.6 As a result, Gandhi often wrote letters directly to a
person or essays published to the public.7 His writing often
contains both social commentary and appeals to readers to act
upon the issues he raised, and they contain themes about what
current environmental commentators would call sustainable
production and consumption.8 For instance, Gandhi cautioned
India to avoid the industrial production processes of the British
Empire:
God forbid that India should ever take to industrialism after the
manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single tiny
kingdom (England) is today keeping the world in chains. If an
entire nation of 300 millions [sic] took to similar economic
exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts. 9

Here, Gandhi noted how unsustainable production will “strip
the world bare,” leading to environmental chaos. In addition, he
simultaneously acknowledged how the stripping of the physical
environment is connected to exploitative social relations. The
exploitation of the poor is an environmental justice issue which
Gandhi connected to resource conservation.
Gandhi also addressed consumption as a key ingredient of
sustainability. Through his own example, he encouraged Indians
to live simply and consume mindfully.10 One of his most well6. MK GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OR THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH
TRUTH viii (1927); see also VENKATRAMAN SUBRAY HEDGE, GANDHI’S PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW (1977) (Revision of author’s thesis, 1983).
7. See MAHATMA GANDHI, COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE
(1999), available at http://www.gandhiserve.org/e/cwmg/cwmg.htm.
8. Id.
9. GANDHI, September 10, 1928 - January 14, 1929, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 412-13 (“[Factories] ought only to be
working under the most attractive and ideal conditions, not for profit, but for
the benefit of humanity, love taking the place of greed as the motive. . . .
Therefore, replace greed by love and everything will come right.” GANDHI,
August 16, 1924 - December 26, 1924, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI
ONLINE, supra note 7, at 266-67); see also Guha, supra note 4, at 65.
10. See MAHATMA GANDHI QUOTES, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/
427443 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (Part of his ethic can be captured by the
saying often attributed to him that “[t]here is enough in the world for everyone’s
need, but not enough for everyone’s greed”); GANDHI, December 14, 1907 – July
22, 1908, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at
207 (Gandhi also stated, “[o]ne should bear in mind that greed always begets
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known preferences was for middle-class Indians to buy locallymade clothing (khadi or khaddar), which he also made with his
spinning wheel.11 He is also famously known for living with only
a handful of material possessions while in pursuit of larger
spiritual and social goals.12 Gandhi’s mindful consumption and
material simplicity challenge the dominant economic thinking in
which the desire to consume is considered by many to be the
economic engine of modern growth and often functions as
justification for expanding markets.13
In contrast to dominant economic theory, Gandhi did not see
economic growth as an end in itself, and instead, focused heavily
on the means by which social needs could be met.14 In other
words, Gandhi held our intentions as a primary consideration in
debating the social good. Rather than using the desire to
consume as a moral trump that justifies the production of goods,
Gandhi balanced the desire to consume with the question of what
and how to consume.15 Gandhi, therefore, uncompromisingly
inserted the requirement of a moral calculus into all economic
considerations.16 In contemporary economic discourse, economic
theorists often treat moral questions as being external to
economic reality and therefore completely disregard moral

sin”); GANDHI, July 22, 1921 – October 25, 1921, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 416 (“Our non-co-operation is neither
with the English nor with the West. Our non-co-operation is with the system the
English have established, with the material civilization and its attendant greed
and exploitation of the weak. . . . Our non-co-operation is a refusal to co-operate
with the English administrators on their own terms. We say to them, ‘Come and
co-operate with us on our terms, and it will be well for us, for you and the
world.’”).
11. AJIT K. DASGUPTA, GANDHI’S ECONOMIC THOUGHT 25-30 (1996).
12. See generally LOUIS FISCHER, GANDHI: HIS LIFE AND MESSAGE FOR THE
WORLD (1982) (The back cover explains the influence of Gandhi’s simplicity and
a photograph of Gandhi’s scarce possessions).
13. See MAHATAMA GANDHI, HIND SWARAJ AND OTHER WRITINGS (Anthony
Parel ed., 1997).
14. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 21-30, 121-22.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 21-30 (discussing “ethical preference” to describe Gandhi’s
inclusion of normative judgment into consumption). I adopt the terms "theory of
trusteeship,” “theory of rights,” and “critique of industrialization" from
Dasgupta.
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consideration.17
However, the huge gulf between moral
philosophy and modern economics that pervades Western thought
was non-existent in Gandhi’s thought: economic behavior and
moral decision-making occurred in the same human beings and
therefore went hand-in-hand.18
In terms of its environmental consequences, a call to exercise
moral decision-making has been a method to change consumption
patterns. Gandhi often associated environmental problems with
poverty; therefore, efforts to change consumption focused on the
consequences to the poor.19 In contrast, for some elites and
biologists, the reason for the need to change consumption
patterns is to protect wildlife.20 This view has come under attack
by commentators who argue that the focus on wildlife produces
an imperialistic outcome on native poorer peoples.21
Commentators criticize preservationists for seeking change in
wildlife areas where the poor reside, rather than challenging
unsustainable practices in wealthy parts of the world.22 The
commentators focus on social equity and argue that the
“wildlands” focus of environmentalism preserves the privilege of

17. Id.
18. See id. (one good example is Gandhi’s endorsement of khadi as opposed to
Indians purchasing Western manufactured clothing. Gandhi viewed this choice
as crucial to India’s economic and political independence from the British).
19. Gandhi stated:
I venture to suggest that it is the fundamental law of Nature,
without exception, that Nature produces enough for our wants from
day to day, and if only everybody took enough for himself and
nothing more, there would be no pauperism in this world, there
would be no man dying of starvation in this world.
John S. Moolakkattu, Gandhi as a Human Ecologist, 29 J. HUM. ECOLOGY 151,
155 (2010).
20. Ramaehandra Guha, Radical American Environmentalism and
Wilderness Preservation: A Third-World Critique, 11 ENVTL. ETHICS 71, 74-75
(1989); see also Nehal Patel, Environmentalism, Consciousness & SchemaBlending: Understanding Activists in the Environmental Movement (Am.
Sociological Ass’n Annual Meeting, July 31, 2008), available at http://www.all
academic.com/meta/p240729_index.html.
21. Guha, supra note 20, at 74-75.
22. Id.
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elite groups, since the poor are the easiest to displace to protect
wildlands.23
Despite these criticisms, a common argument in favor of
pursuing wildlife preservation is that scientists are the experts
who can determine which places are to be protected.24 However,
the consequence of this view is that power shifts from those elites
The
who control business to those who dictate science.25
argument is cleverly political as much as it is a plea to save
ecosystems, but in the process of shifting power from big business
to scientists, the interests of the poor–who often are living in the
“protected” area–are compromised or neglected. In this debate
between elites, the economic and political structures responsible
for labeling the poor areas as “contested” are left entirely intact.
Gandhi spared no effort in pointing out the interests of the
invisible masses.26 His focus on the needs of the disempowered
complicate the search for the environmental good; neither the
argument for the “greater good” through economic growth nor the
one through ecosystem preservation provide any direct resolution
to the exploitative characteristics of the debate itself. However,
this has not stopped those involved in the “debate between elites”
from co-opting Gandhi’s emphasis on people and therefore
absorbing his social equity critique.27 For instance, the claim
that deep ecology has eastern antecedents is reflected in Zen
teacher Robert Aitken Roshi’s claim that Gandhi is not humancentered, but rather eco-centered.28 This view has been criticized
for reflecting an idea of the “East” as a collection of selected
cultural images used by Western commentators to create their
23. See Syvlia Tesh & Eduardo Paes-Machado, Sewers, Garbage, and
Environmentalism in Brazil, 13 J. ENV’T & DEV. 42 (2004); see also BARRY
COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN & TECHNOLOGY (1972).
24. See SYLVIA TEST, UNCERTAIN HAZARDS: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS AND
SCIENTIFIC PROOF (2000).
25. Daniel Janzen, The Future of Tropical Ecology, 17 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY &
SYSTEMATICS 305 (1986).
26. See GANDHI, supra note 6, at 464.
27. See MICHAEL COHEN, THE PATHLESS WAY: JOHN MUIR AND AMERICAN
WILDERNESS 120 (1984) (an example of Orientalist conceptions of
environmentalism); EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1980) (a critique of Orientalist
framing in the West); Ronald Inden, Orientalist Constructions of India, 20 MOD.
ASIAN STUD. 442 (1986); see also Guha, supra note 20, at 63-65.
28. See Guha, supra note 20.
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own image of the human-nature relationship.29 Keeping in line
with both the orientalist and romanticist views–both of which
have an interest in keeping the East looking “mystical” and
“exotic”–many contemporary environmentalists continue to view
many “eastern” thinkers in a light favorable to, and compatible
with, their own views.30
Any analysis of nature preservation at the expense of social
equity would be a problematic application of Gandhi’s life and
teachings.
Therefore, when imagining how a mindful
jurisprudence would apply to an environmental dispute, we must
consider Gandhi’s central ideas about the complex relationships
between the rich, the poor, and natural resources. We provide
speculations on how Gandhi’s thought can enrich environmental
jurisprudence if we begin with his own views on core concepts in
social theory31 as they apply to law.
B. Gandhi’s Influence on Law
Ironically, the very profession Gandhi undertook as a young
man–law–does not seem to have been influenced to the same
degree as many other areas of thought. Although his world-view
influenced many elites and has had some impact on law in India
in areas such as corporate social responsibility,32 Gandhi has not
deeply impacted the method of jurisprudence in India or
elsewhere. Despite several calls in the contemporary critical
legal scholarship for alternative views of law and legal systems,33
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Lester R. Kurtz, Gandhi and His Legacies, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
VIOLENCE, PEACE, AND CONFLICT 837 (2d ed. 2008).
32. Afra Afsharipour, Directors as Trustees of the Nation? India’s Corporate
Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Reform Efforts, 34 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 995 (2011).
33. See Yxta Maya Murray, A Jurisprudence of Nonviolence, 9 CONN. PUB.
INT. L.J. 65 (2009); see AJIT ATRI, GANDHI’S VIEW OF LEGAL JUSTICE (2007).
Professor Jai Narain Sharma remarks in the forward: “[t]he legal profession has
produced some of the finest and most independent characters whose names are
imprinted on the scroll of history. Mahatma Gandhi is one among them . . .
[Atri] has raised several pertinent questions regarding legal justice in general
and Gandhi’s view in particular.” Id. at xii-xiii; see also HEDGE, supra note 6;
V.R. KRISHNA IYER, JURISPRUDENCE AND JURISCONSCIENCE A LA GANDHI (1976).
For existing varieties of legal consciousness in environmental activism, see

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/5

8

1124

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

few scholars have made any serious attempt to speculate on how
jurisprudence can be critiqued and reformed using Gandhi’s
thought.
Some commentators criticize legal thought as a system of
ideas wrapped in its own tradition and unable to examine itself
reflexively.34 Philosopher Wolcher believes “a philosophical work
that limits itself to ‘law’ in the popular or academic sense has
already sold its soul, as it were, to conventional ways of
thinking.”35 Legal scholarship itself is susceptible to the strong
pull of legal doctrines that stress the authority of precedent, and
this tendency creates a problem when issues call for innovative or
original insight.
Tradition can become an impediment to
breaking through centuries-old assumptions that deeply shape
legal thought, whether it be about the nature of reality, the
composition of the self (and therefore the basis of rights), or the
goals of social interactions.
Gandhi’s thought provides law scholars with an opportunity
to question many of the fundamental social assumptions
embedded in traditional legal thought. Given that Gandhi
operated in both “Western” and “Eastern” paradigms
simultaneously, he provides us with a basis for transcending the
entrenched “East/West” divisions of our collective colonial past
and the manner in which non-Western thought systems have
been excluded from serious consideration in social theory.
Gandhi’s writings strengthen alternative conceptions of
environmental jurisprudence because many of his assumptions
about the nature of reality and his conception of ethics do not
entirely conform to the dominant philosophical frameworks of the
West. Using Gandhi as a building block in the conception of a
new jurisprudence gives us freedom to question the basic
organizing principles that are treated as conventional wisdom in
Western thought. Furthermore, our critique functions as a
comprehensive alternative to dominant ways of thinking. Our
Nehal Patel, The Consciousness of Legal Mobilization (Am. Sociological Ass’n
Annual Meeting, Aug. 14, 2010), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/
p410518_index.html.
34. See LOUIS E. WOLCHER, BEYOND TRANSCENDENCE IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
(2005).
35. Id. at x.
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view is more than a mere criticism because Gandhi’s thought
contains a well-developed world-view from which we derive our
own solutions and conclusions.
To use Gandhi’s thought to reimagine jurisprudence, we
must first identify themes that pervade his thought and apply
them to legal arguments. We will apply several themes in
Gandhi’s life and writings to a recent case: MCWC. There are
two reasons for using this case. First, the case has clear local
ecological and legal importance to the state of Michigan and the
surrounding area. Second, the case embodies many of the
fundamental struggles common in both Gandhi’s writings and in
the environmental law between wealthy developers and local
civilians.
In Part II, we provide a brief summary of the facts and the
key legal concepts used in the briefs submitted to the court by
Nestlé, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, and in amicus
curiae briefs submitted by the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality and the National Wildlife Federation. We
place special emphasis on the Public Trust Doctrine, Reasonable
Use Doctrine, riparian rights, the “ecosystem nexus” theory, and
determination of “significant public interest” as they relate to
Gandhi’s thought.
II. KEY LEGAL CONCEPTS OF MCWC V. NESTLÉ
In MCWC, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation
(Citizens) filed a civil action against Nestlé for the illegal use of a
waterway in northern Michigan.36 The waterway consisted of a
small river (the Dead Stream), a trio of bodies of water called the
“Tri-Lakes,” and the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetland.37
Nestlé was granted groundwater rights from Donald Patrick and
Nancy Gale Bollman, who were riparian owners living on the
property along the Dead Steam.38 Nestlé obtained “all water
rights in and under the [p]roperty” and “the right ‘to develop, use,
extract, remove, pump and/or consume from any and all water
sources thereon’” when Nestlé purchased the subsurface
36. See MCWC, 737 N.W.2d at 447.
37. Id. at 450.
38. Id.
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ground.39 The Bollmans also “leased to Nestlé the surface of the
[p]roperty and granted Nestlé easements of ingress and egress to,
from, and across the property.”40 Nestlé accessed groundwater
under the Bollmans’ land via a pumping facility that Nestlé built
along the Dead Stream.41
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
The Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) provides that some
resources can be held in trust for the public good.42 Over a
century ago, the United States Supreme Court upheld the PTD by
declaring that such lands cannot lawfully be conveyed for a
private corporation’s profit-seeking use.43 Michigan courts use a
test of “navigability” to determine whether or not a waterway can
be protected from corporate use under the PTD.44 If a waterway
is capable of sustaining commercial shipping, then the courts
deem the stream navigable,45 and therefore, the waterway could
be protected under the PTD.46 Michigan courts use a “logflotation test” to determine whether a stream is capable of
sustaining commercial shipping and therefore subject to
protection under the PTD.47 The log-flotation test states that a
stream must have the capacity to float a number of large mill logs
on the stream or body of water, thus making it navigable and
capable of sustaining commercial shipping.48
39. Brief for Defendant-Appellee Opposition to Plaintiffs-Appellants'
Application for Leave to Appeal at 5, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation
v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc. (Citizens), 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005)
(No. 130802) [hereinafter Defendant’s Opposition Brief].
40. Id.
41. MCWC, 737 N.W.2d at 450.
42. PHILIP WEINBERG & KEVIN A. REILLY, UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 51 (2d ed. 2008).
43. Id.
44. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 218-20.
45. Id. at 218; see also Plaintiff-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal
at 34-36, Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (No. 256153)
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Application].
46. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 218-20.
47. Id. at 220.
48. Id. at 218. The parties and the court use the term “mill logs” to describe
large logs, but the court did not give a description of the weight or length of a
mill log.
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In the trial court, Citizens moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the “Dead Stream is subject to the public trust
doctrine, and that diminishment of the flow of a public trust
stream for diversion and sale by a private person for a private
profit is unlawful.”49 The trial court rejected Citizens’ motion for
summary judgment.50 On appeal, Citizens cited Bott v. Natural
Resources Commission,51 arguing that the Dead Stream is
capable of floating a commercially viable log because the stream
is capable of floating a “shingle bolt,” which is defined as a
sixteen to eighteen inch chunk of wood.52 In contrast, Nestlé
argued that the Dead Stream did not need protection under the
PTD because only the stream’s “public access” points require
protection to preserve the public’s interest in the waterway.53
Nestlé reasoned that a body of water near the Dead Stream called
“the Tri-Lakes” provides the Dead Stream with “public access”
points which need protection, and therefore, the stream itself
does not require protection under the PTD.54 Furthermore,
Nestlé argued that the Dead Stream is not subject to the PTD
since they are not withdrawing water directly from the stream.55
Instead, Nestlé claims it was pumping water from an aquifer that
is the source of springs that feed the Dead Stream.56
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Citizens’ protection
of the Dead Stream under the PTD.57 However, the court of
appeals also rejected Nestlé’s public trust reasoning that the area
is protected by protection of the “access points” only, as opposed
to providing protection to the entire stream.58 The court cited
Moore v. Sanborne, in which an entire waterway is navigable, and
therefore subject to the PTD, if it will sustain commercial
49. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 6.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Bott v. Comm’n of Natural Res. of State of Mich. Dept. of Natural Res.,
327 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. 1982).
52. See Plaintiff’s Application, supra note 45, at 34-36 (discussing Bott).
53. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 34-35.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 36-39.
56. Id.
57. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
58. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Nestlé’s
claim.
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shipping or if its natural state has the capacity to float mill logs.59
The court of appeals reasoned that Moore and Bott both require
the floating of large mill logs to demonstrate navigability.60
Under this reasoning, the court concluded that the Dead Stream
failed the log-flotation test.61 Therefore, both the trial court and
court of appeals determined that the Dead Stream was not
navigable and unable to sustain commercial shipping.
Consequently, the stream is not protected under the PTD.62
B. The Reasonable Use Doctrine
The reasonable use doctrine is used frequently, and Michigan
uses a “reasonable-use balancing test.”63 The balancing test for
the reasonable use doctrine in Michigan is the same “log-flotation
test” applied to the PTD. The “log-flotation test” states that a
stream must hold the capacity to float a number of large mill logs
to be considered navigable. If the Dead Stream is not considered
navigable, then the stream could not sustain commercial
shipping.64 Therefore, since the court of appeals concluded that
the Dead Stream was not navigable, the use of the Dead Stream
by Nestlé for commercial purposes did not qualify as reasonable
use.65
The reasonable use doctrine also includes a “fair
participation” component which balances the utility of competing
parties’ claims to reasonable use.66 Michigan courts use a fair
participation test that takes into account whether the water
being withdrawn is used “on-tract” or “off-tract.”67 In MCWC, the
dispute over reasonable use compares the plaintiff’s riparian
right to the reasonable use of the Dead Stream versus Nestlé’s

59. Id. (citing Moore v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519 (1853)).
60. Id. at 218-19.
61. Id. at 219.
62. See id. at 222.
63. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 19; see also Citizens, 709
N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
64. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 19.
65. Id. at 20-21.
66. Id. at 10 (“Michigan courts have sought to ensure ‘the greatest possible
access to water for all users while protecting certain traditional water uses.’”).
67. Id.; see also Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 199.
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right to the reasonable use of groundwater from the land it owns
in fee simple.68 Nestlé purchased the subsurface ground from
Donald Patrick and Nancy Gale Bollman, who were riparian
owners living on the property.69 When they purchased the land,
Nestlé claimed to obtain “all water rights in and under the
[p]roperty” and “the right to develop, use, extract, remove, pump,
and/or consume from any and all water sources thereon.”70 In
addition, the Bollmans leased to Nestlé “the surface of the
[p]roperty and granted Nestlé easements of ingress and egress to,
from, and across the [p]roperty.”71
The trial court originally ruled that an off-tract, out-ofwatershed use of groundwater cannot measurably diminish the
flow of surface water to another riparian.72 In other words, the
trial court states that off-tract use is defined as use out of the
relevant watershed, or out if its source watershed or groundwater
aquifer,73 and off-tract use cannot reduce the natural flow to the
riparian body.74 The trial court’s emphasis on limiting off-tract
use suggests that uses of water off-tract should be treated
differently than uses of water on-tract in the relevant watershed
or aquifer.75 Under this reasoning, Nestlé argued that its actions
constituted a “reasonable use.”76 Furthermore, Nestlé employed
utilitarian reasoning, arguing that “Michigan courts have sought
to ensure ‘the greatest possible access to water for all users while
protecting certain traditional water uses.’”77 Nestlé relied heavily
on the interpretation of “fair participation” as “the use of water by

68. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 205.
69. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 4. However, the court
repeatedly stated that Nestlé was not a riparian owner regardless of Nestlé’s
claim to possessing all water rights.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 8; see also Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé
Waters N. Am., Inc., 2003 WL 25659349, at *48 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003).
73. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 2003 WL 25659349, at *48.
74. Id.; see also Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 10 (stating,
“Michigan courts have sought to ensure 'the greatest possible access to water for
all users while protecting certain traditional water uses.’”).
75. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 23-43.
76. Id. at 24.
77. Id. at 10.
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the greatest number of users.”78 It claimed that since there are
many non-riparian users who can benefit from Nestlé’s access to
the water resource, the riparian owners’ rights should not impede
what is in the interest of the greatest good for the greatest
number of people.79
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s statement of
the law and adopted a different version of the reasonable-use
balancing test.80 Using its own utilitarian reasoning, the court
sought to ensure the greatest possible access to water resources
for all users while protecting certain traditional water users.81
Consequently, the court’s reasonable-use test requires a
determination of what is considered a “traditional water use.”82
In making this determination, the court of appeals listed a
number of balancing test factors that are to be considered.83 The
factors are not listed in any hierarchy of importance, and the
court’s reasoning provides no clear guidance regarding how the
several factors are to be weighed should they fail to point to a
specific outcome.84 Presumably, the court’s guidance is vague
because of the need to apply the test on a case-by-case basis.85 In
the past, Michigan courts have avoided strict reasonable use
interpretations for this reason.86

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 10-11.
See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 201 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 202-05.
See id.
However, the court did give preference to riparian uses:
Further, in order to ensure that the needs of local water users are
met first, water uses that benefit the riparian land or the land from
which the groundwater was removed are given preference over water
uses that ship the water away or otherwise benefit land unconnected
with the location from which the water was extracted.
Id. at 204.
86. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 29 (“Michigan has long
eschewed such rigid formulations, instead adopting a reasonable-use test
allowing courts to ‘consider all the circumstances that are relevant in a given
case,’ in order to protect the environment, while at the same time promoting
socially and economically beneficial water uses.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Although the court of appeals did not provide much guidance
for future cases, it entered a final order on February 14, 2006
stating that Nestlé’s water removal was unreasonable.87 The
court of appeals cited Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor88 in which
there was a dispute between an on-tract user of groundwater and
a city that planned to pump groundwater off-tract to meet
Schenk raised the idea of “material
municipal needs.89
diminishment” in reasonable use, which means an off-tract user
cannot cause an interference with an on-tract use.90 Schenk drew
a distinction between on-tract and off-tract users, which created
different standards of reasonable use for on-tract and off-tract
users.91 Although the court of appeals used reasoning from
Schenk to limit Nestlé’s conduct, it also cited limitations for ontract users in dicta.92 The court of appeals cited Maerz v. U.S.
Steel93 in support of the proposition that an on-tract user of
groundwater cannot unreasonably interfere with a neighbor’s ontract use.94
C. Riparian Rights
The common law of riparian rights recognizes that an owner
of streamside, or riparian, property has a right to the absolute,
unimpeded flow of water, and the owner can obtain damages or
an injunction against an upstream owner for interference with
that right.95 The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff’s
riparian rights outweigh Nestlé’s contractual right to the
reasonable use of groundwater from the Bollmans’ land.96 Nestlé
purchased from the Bollmans the subsurface ground beneath 139
acres of the Sanctuary.97 “Nestlé also obtained ‘all water rights

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1.
Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109 (Mich. 1917).
See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 197-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
Schenk, 163 N.W. at 112.
Id. at 112-15.
See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 200.
Maerz v. U.S. Steel Corp., 323 N.W.2d 524, 529-30 (1982).
See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 200.
See WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 42, at 50.
See generally Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174.
Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 4.
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in and under the Property,’ and the right ‘to develop, use, extract,
remove, pump and/or consume water from any and all water
sources thereon.’”98 Additionally, “the Bollmans leased to Nestlé
the surface of the Property and granted Nestlé easements of
ingress and egress to, from, and across the Property.”99 Nestlé
argued that this fee gave Nestlé property rights to use the
groundwater, a right just as valid and enforceable as the
Plaintiff’s riparian rights to use the Dead Stream.100
Citizens argued that Nestlé’s purchase of the land did not
allow them to obtain riparian rights to the Dead Stream.101 In
addition, Citizens argued that they were successful in meeting
their burden of proof regarding harm to their riparian
interests.102 Citizens also argued that an “off-tract user could not
cause any interference with a use on-tract.”103 To support their
claim, Citizens cited Hart v. D’Agostini,104 which said the
removal, transporting, and consumption of water elsewhere (i.e.,
to a location other than the original source) is an unreasonable
use of the specific land.105 Moreover, the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF) filed an Amicus Curiae Brief and stated that
the Michigan Conservations Club, Tip of the Miff Watershed
Council, Pickerel-Crooked Lakes Association, and many other
organizations have an interest in the Osprey Lake Impoundment
and Wetland.106 The Amici argued that many organization

98. Id. at 5.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id. Citizens also assert that their use of the stream is a reasonable use
worthy of protection.
102. See Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 207 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Plaintiff’s
Application, supra note 45, at 2.
103. Plaintiff’s Application, supra note 45, at 22. Citizens also cited Schenk v.
City of Ann Arbor, which involved a public water company intentionally
removing water from the original source and transporting it elsewhere for
consumption. Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N.W. 109, 110 (Mich. 1917).
104. 151 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967).
105. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am.,
Inc., 2003 WL 25659349, at *48 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003).
106. See Brief for the National Wildlife Federation et al. as Amici Curiae at 1,
Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (No. 130802) [hereinafter NWF’s
Brief].
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members had vested riparian property interests that could be
affected by the outcome of the case.107
The trial court held in favor of Citizens’ claim that riparian
uses were superior to groundwater uses.108 However, in this
situation, the trial court rejected the correlative rights rule,
stating that the rule applies to competing groundwater users,
rather than applying to competing uses between an off-tract and
on-tract user.109 Therefore, although the court rejected the
correlative rights rule, the court made a clear connection between
riparian users, on-tract versus off-tract use, and reasonable use.
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial court holding
that riparian uses were superior to groundwater uses and added
that “[t]he loss of recreational use and the physical alteration of
the Dead Stream will directly and substantially harm the
riparian value of the Dead Stream.”110 The court of appeals also
held that the plaintiffs (Citizens) have standing because of their
status as riparian owners.111 As NWF stated in their brief,
“[Citizens] are riparian owners who live and recreate in the area
negatively affected by Nestlé’s pumping.”112
Furthermore,
“harms to the Osprey Lake Impoundment and the Enumerated
Wetlands negatively affect Plaintiffs’ riparian properties, as well
as Plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their riparian rights, which
include recreational and aesthetic interests in maintaining the
ecological integrity of the area.”113

107. Id. at 1.
108. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 2003 WL 25659349, at *47.
109. Id. (“The court there uses what it called the “correlative rights” rule,
relying on the Restatement of torts, 2nd sec. 858. That tort concept applies to
competing users of groundwater, a situation not relevant here.”).
110. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 206 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
111. Id. at 208.
112. NWF’s Brief, supra note 106, at 14.
113. Id.
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D. Ecosystem Nexus Theory
The basis of standing referred to as “ecosystem nexus theory”
was discussed in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.114 Ecosystem
nexus theorizes that by “recognizing the complex, reciprocal
nature of the ecosystem as well as the hydrologic interaction,
connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources .
. . [the] negative effects on one part [of an aquifer system is] likely
to impact another in such a shallow aquifer system.”115 In other
words, portions of the ecosystem are not to be individually
considered when damage has occurred. Rather, when examining
injury, the entire ecosystem should be taken as a whole.116
Ecosystem nexus theory directly relates to MCWC because
the theory challenges Nestlé’s implicit contention that each
affected body of water should be treated as if it existed in a
bubble.117 Nestlé argued that their pumping along one stream
was not reason enough for Plaintiffs to bring suit regarding the
Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands.118
However, in
contrast to the basis of Nestlé’s argument, ecosystem nexus
theory states that all bodies of water in a contiguous ecosystem
are interconnected, and the negative effects of one lake
impoundment will inevitably affect the biological character of
another interconnected lake impoundment, and so on.119

114. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 (1992); see also Brief for
Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality as Amici Curiae at 23-24, Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005) [hereinafter DEQ’s Brief].
115. DEQ’s Brief, supra note 114, at 24.
116. Id.
117. MCWC, 737 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Mich. 2007). Court of Appeals Judges
White and Murphy, forming the majority on the standing question, disagreed
with Nestlé. Concurring that plaintiffs had standing “with respect to all the
natural resources at issue,” Judge Murphy wrote that “plaintiffs have standing
because of the complex, reciprocal nature of the ecosystem that encompasses the
pertinent natural resources noted above and because of the hydrologic
interaction, connection, or interrelationship between these natural resources,
the springs, the aquifer, and defendant Nestle’s pumping activities, whereby
impact on one particular resource caused by Nestle’s pumping necessarily
affects other resources in the surrounding area.” Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 225
(Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
118. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174.
119. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1992).
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The trial court and court of appeals in MCWC acknowledged
the definition of ecosystem nexus in Lujan120 and found that the
Dead Stream and the Osprey Lake Impoundment are both a part
of the Tri-Lakes ecosystem, therefore making them subject to the
ecosystem nexus theory.121 In other words, the court ruled that
these bodies of water are part of an aquatic watershed and
therefore constitute a contiguous ecosystem.122 Additionally, the
trial court stated that all interconnected bodies of water,
including the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands, are
negatively affected by Nestlé’s use, and the ecosystem as a whole
suffers as a result of Nestlé’s pumping.123 The court further
noted that Nestlé’s pumping had a negative effect on the level,
temperature, and quality of water in the Dead Stream, including
adjacent wetlands.124 The court also noted that eventually, the
entire ecosystem’s natural and biological character is weakened
because it becomes more susceptible to invasive species and
changes to the fundamental characteristics of the entire
ecosystem.125 The court noted that Nestlé’s pumping has such a
negative effect on the Osprey Lake Impoundment and adjacent
wetlands that it destabilizes the ecological integrity of the entire
ecosystem.126 Therefore, the court concluded that the effects of
Nestlé’s pumping were reason enough for the Plaintiffs to bring
suit.127

120. MCWC, 737 N.W.2d at 457.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc.,
2003 WL 25659349, at *13 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003). In addition, the court not only
stressed that the negative effects on one part likely impacts another, but the
damage is worse for such a shallow aquifer system such as the Osprey Lake
Impoundment Watershed. Id.
124. Id. at *31.
125. Id. at *36.
126. Id. at *41.
127. See generally id. For the full reasoning of the trial court as explained by
the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, see DEQ’s Brief, supra
note 114, at 24-26.
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E. Significant Public Interest
The concept of “significant public interest” plays a crucial
role throughout the MCWC. The trial court and court of appeals
both agreed that the Legislature has the authority to provide a
means for any citizen to protect their interest in the preservation
of the state’s natural resources due to significant public
interest.128 The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality
(MDEQ) submitted an amicus curiae brief that suggested specific
causes of action for those affected by pollution, impairment, or
destruction of natural resources against specific persons who
cause such pollution, impairment, or destruction.129 Moreover,
MDEQ’s brief explained the grounds for claims that address
significant public interest in matters such as the case against
Nestlé.130 While the Michigan Environmental Protection Act was
being enacted, MDEQ wanted to provide for the protection of
natural resources by creating a cause of action for an interest
reserved by the people. MDEQ argued that the people of
Michigan declared in the state’s Constitution that the manner in
which natural resources of the state are conserved and developed
is of “paramount public concern.”131
Furthermore, “[t]he
conservation and development of the natural resources of the
state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in
the interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the
people.”132
The court referenced the Michigan Constitution, which
indicates that proper conservation and development of natural
resources impacts the health, safety, and general welfare of the
citizens of Michigan.133 The court concluded that the matters
raised in MCWC are matters of significant public interest.134

128. DEQ’s Brief, supra note 114, at 21.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 10-11.
131. Id. at 11.
132. Id.
133. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc.,
2003 WL 25659349, at *52 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2003).
134. See generally id.
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III. SPECULATIONS ON A MINDFUL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT
In Part III, we analyze the legal briefs and court opinion in
MCWC by applying Gandhi’s thought to the concepts central to
the case.
We highlight Gandhi’s view of environmental
trusteeship, utility, rights, and industrialization. Through this
concrete application of Gandhi’s thought, we seek to develop a
jurisprudence that is more mindful of its broader implications to
the environment and society.
A. Connecting the Public Trust Doctrine to Gandhi’s
Theory of Trusteeship
Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship influences certain areas of law
and society in India, such as the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) discourse.135 Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship when applied
to CSR has been called “revolutionary”136 and had as its
foundation a world-view that eschewed the modern acceptance of
profit purely for the sake of private owners. He viewed the

135. Afsharipour, supra note 32, at 1012-13; see also Timothy L. Fort & Cindy
A. Schipani, The Role of the Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace, 35
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 426 (2002) (“There is a belief underlying
contemporary business strategy that as long as one operates within the bounds
of the law, one is free to engage in any business practice that does not harm the
self-interest of the company. Implicit in this understanding is the notion that
other societal institutions are in place to protect interests that require
protecting, so that it is not the responsibility of a corporation to be concerned
with these issues.”). Gandhi says 90% of people need no governance, only the
top 5% constituted by greedy white collar or black market criminals and the
bottom 5% comprised of common criminals. VED MEHTA, MAHATMA GANDHI AND
HIS APOSTLES 214 (1977).
136. See Afsharipour, supra note 32, at 1013 (“Gandhi's view of the ownership
of capital was one of trusteeship motivated by the belief that essentially society
was providing capitalists with an opportunity to manage resources which need
to be managed on behalf of society in general.”) (citation omitted); see also
MEERA MITRA, IT'S ONLY BUSINESS! INDIA'S CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS IN
A GLOBALIZED WORLD 20-25 (2007); Interview by Jitendra Singh with R.
Bandyophadyay, Chairman, Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Wharton
School (June 17, 2010), available at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/
article.cfm?articleid=4488 (the Chairman stated that directors and senior
management are “custodians of public money, they are the trustees—if we go to
the Mahatma Gandhi concept of trusteeship . . . . They are actually the trustees
of the nation.”).
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wealth of the richest individuals and organizations as being part
of the nation’s wealth, and he viewed the control of that wealth as
carrying with it the responsibility to use it for the social good.137
Many view Gandhi’s view of trusteeship to imply income
equality, and Gandhi certainly expressed concern about the wide
gaps between the rich and poor.138 However, it was the use of
wealth for meaningful social goals that concerned Gandhi, and
this concern did not necessarily imply income equality as an end
for its own sake.139 Gandhi tolerated some amount of inequality
provided that the wealthy used their resources for the benefit of
society.140 Equality by itself did not necessarily focus on his
ultimate goal: to use wealth for the “social good.”141

137. GANDHI, September 10, 1928 – January 14, 1929, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 413 (“Unless the capitalists of India
help to avert that tragedy by becoming trustees of the welfare of the masses and
by devoting their talents not to amassing wealth for themselves but to the
service of the masses in an altruistic spirit, they will end either by destroying
the masses or being destroyed by them.”).
138. GANDHI, July 16, 1940 – December 27, 1940, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 114 (India’s economy will “be a
structure on sand if it is not built on the solid foundation of economic equality…
everyone will have a proper house to live in, sufficient and balanced food to eat,
and sufficient khadi with which to cover himself. It also means that the cruel
inequality that obtains today will be removed by purely non-violent means.”).
139. GANDHI, September 16, 1934 – December 15, 1934, in COLLECTED WORKS
OF MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 318 (however, Gandhi did believe
that his principle of trusteeship would produce more equality than the status
quo. He said, “[a]bsolute trusteeship is an abstraction like Euclid’s definition of
a point, and is equally unattainable. But if we strive for it, we shall be able to go
further in realizing a state of equality on earth than by any other method.”).
140. GANDHI, July 16, 1940 – Dec. 27, 1940, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA
GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 114 (“Economic equality must never be
supposed to mean possession of an equal amount of worldly goods by
everyone.”); see also DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 91.
141. GANDHI, July 16, 1940 – Dec. 27, 1940, in COLLECTED WORKS OF MAHATMA
GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 133-34 (“[A]t the root of this doctrine of equal
distribution must lie that of the trusteeship of the wealthy for the superfluous
wealth possessed by them. . . . The rich man will be left in possession of his
wealth, of which he will use what he reasonably requires for his personal needs
and will act as a trustee for the remainder to be used for the society. . . . As soon
as man looks upon himself as a servant of society, earns for its sake, spends for
its benefit, then purity enters into his earnings and there is ahimsa in his
venture. Moreover, if men’s minds turn towards this way of life, there will come
about a peaceful revolution in society, and that without any bitterness.”).
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Gandhi’s conception of social good included the proper longterm management of natural resources.142 His concern that
India’s adoption of Western economy would “strip the earth bare”
Similarly, in
shows a strong concern for stewardship.143
contemporary jurisprudence, the idea of resource management
relies on a view of people as “stewards” of the environment.
However, American jurisprudence implicitly accepts the Western
human-environment dialectic as a foundation of thought. This
particular dialectic imagines the world as a place containing
resources for people to use; as a result, the notion of humans
having dominion over the earth and the right to acquire property
for private use has a long history of influence in American
jurisprudence.
In contrast, Gandhi’s world-view does not accept this humanenvironment dialectic. Gandhi referred to his life’s goal as being
“to make myself zero,”144 and pursuing this goal was his effort to
preserve the dignity of the individual and the world. His
conception of himself perhaps is best expressed in the Sanskrit
maxim “tat tvam asi” (meaning “you are that” or “you are the
other”), the full realization of which is life’s highest goal. As a
result, for Gandhi, the goal of life was to “reduce to zero” the
perceived distance between the self and other. This view of the
world makes the treatment of the “other”–whether that other is
“human,” “sentient,” or “inanimate” in the Western conception–as
important as treatment of oneself. In his conception of the world,
violence to one’s surroundings was as destructive as violence done

142. GANDHI, September 10, 1928 – January 14, 1929, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 412-13 (“If an entire nation of 300
millions [sic] took to similar economic exploitation [by the West], it would strip
the world bare like locusts.”).
143. Even the question of whether “natural” objects can be represented in
court has been a point of resource management debate in both India and the
United States. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?: LAW,
MORALITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT, n.1 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2010)
(discussing the idol case in India and criticisms waged in U.S. jurisprudence at
the question of whether trees should have standing).
144. GANDHI, supra note 6, at 464 (“I must reduce myself to zero. So long as
man does not of his own free will put himself last among his fellow-creatures,
there is no salvation for him. Ahimsa is the farthest limit of humility.”); see
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 122 (discussing possible theological influences on
Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship).
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unto oneself, and therefore, the world was conceived of as a
family.145
Gandhi constantly tried to expand the notion of family to
include the world and not merely one’s immediate kin. He often
referred to his life as a series of “experiments with Truth,” and
the vehicle of Truth was ahimsa, or “non-violence.” Through
exploring ahimsa, Gandhi concluded that “for a non-violent
person, the whole world is one family. He will not fear others nor
will others fear him.”146 To Gandhi, it seems that to engulf the
entire world in the notion of family was the logical conclusion of
ahimsa and the social manifestation of “tat tvam asi.” Naturally,
then, a life lived through ahimsa led to the view that the wealthy
held their wealth in trust for the benefit of their entire family.
Gandhi’s expanded conception of the family, therefore,
implicitly informs his theory of trusteeship. The theory is
grounded in a world-view that recognizes the universe as a single
entity, one that is comprised of parts that seem different at first
appearance but fundamentally are the same. As a result, all
people had a duty to care for the world as one family, with the
wealthy playing a significant role due to their unique social
position.147
Therefore, one way to view the PTD using Gandhi’s thought
is to view it as incumbent upon wealthy entities to use their
145. See DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 121-22 (Non-violence not only mattered
in terms of the ends of human conduct, but also was significant to the means of
human conduct for Gandhi. Therefore, non-violent treatment of others was
important not only for the well-being of the other, but also as a practice that
both reflected and cultivated a non-violent mind for the practitioner. For a
discussion of non-violence applied to trusteeship).
146. MADHU MASKAN, THE QUINTESSENCE OF GANDHI: IN HIS OWN WORDS
(1984).
147. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 118-29. This world-view has its roots in a
special form of “experimentation” that involves an exploration of the human
mind. For an expanded discussion of world-view, see EKNATH EASWARAN, THE
UPANISHADS 7-30 (1987); EKNATH EASWARAN, THE DHAMMAPADA 7-77 (1985). For
a cognitive social science discussion of world-view, mind, and environmentalism,
see Nehal Ambalal Patel, Consciousness in the Environmental Movement (2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University) (on file with
Northwestern University Library); see also Nehal Patel, Schemas, Cognitive
Social Science, and Blending in Social Movements: The Case of Environmental
Activists (Am. Sociological Ass’n Annual Meeting, Aug. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p504537_index.html.
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wealth in the interests of the public good. In contemporary
American jurisprudence and its Roman origins, the PTD views
the state as trustee of the land, and therefore, responsibility for
the lands falls on the government.148 It is well established in
American jurisprudence that lands held in Public Trust cannot be
“conveyed for a private corporation’s profit-seeking use.”149
Therefore, the common law of the PTD already restrains the
profit-seeking of corporations, but American common law does not
speak to any role of trusteeship upon the wealthy.
In contrast, Gandhi’s emphasis on the wealth of the rich
being held in trust raises the question of how and why our
jurisprudence does not raise this sense of responsibility directly
onto wealthy organizations.
Under Gandhi’s theory of
trusteeship, in MCWC, a multi-billion dollar corporation such as
Nestlé would have to address its responsibility as trustee of the
nation’s wealth (in this case, the nation’s wealth is its natural
resources such as the Dead Stream ecosystem). Rather than
viewing the corporation in the negative–as an entity to restrain–
Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship views the corporation in the
positive–as an entity whose responsibilities are to be realized and
demanded. Therefore, an application of Gandhi’s theory of
trusteeship to the law shifts the focus from how to prevent
negative corporate behavior to how to unleash positive corporate
social responsibility.
B. Connecting the Reasonable Use Doctrine &
“Significant Public Interest” to Sarvodaya
a.

The Reasonable Use Doctrine

Gandhi’s thought contains guidelines for reasonable use of
goods and resources that are different from most Western views.
In classical utilitarianism, for instance, the maxim “the greatest
good for the greatest number of people” is used to validate the use
of a good or resource. Nestlé used such reasoning when it argued
148. WEINBERG & REILLY, supra note 42, at 51 (Originally from Roman and
English Common law, in which the Crown was responsible for the lands as
trustee).
149. Id. at 51; Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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that its use of the Dead Stream would result in thousands of
gallons of bottled water that a large number of people will
drink.150 In other words, Nestlé’s use of the stream arguably
leads to the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
In contrast to a classical utilitarian view, Gandhi used a view
based on “the welfare of all” which he termed sarvodaya.151 Both
sarvodaya and utilitarianism relate to the reasonable use
doctrine because they both contain guiding principles to
determine reasonable use. In a standard utilitarian analysis, the
question is examined by asking what provides the greatest good
to the greatest number; in sarvodaya, the question is examined
by asking what is in the welfare of all.
Because “use” is the central concept in the Reasonable Use
Doctrine, we must engage Gandhi’s thought by beginning with
guidance he provides on what constitutes proper “use.” To
determine proper use in Gandhi’s thought, we can begin by
considering the difference between “want-regarding” and “idealregarding” economic behavior. Barry distinguishes between
“want-regarding” and “ideal-regarding” principles of economics.152
In the “want-regarding” principle, people’s preferences for certain
goods or services are treated as an implicit starting point for
economic analysis, in which people’s wants are accepted as they
are, and markets emerge to provide opportunities to satisfy those
wants. In “want-regarding” reasoning, policy is shaped by the
question of how people’s wants can be attained. This is the
dominant perspective in contemporary economic thought. In
contrast, the “ideal-regarding” principle considers that some
wants are not worth satisfying, and therefore, economic
behavior–including what people want–is mediated by human
values. In other words, “ideal-regarding” behavior would not
place priority solely on what people want; rather, other
considerations, such as a person’s ethical preferences, are of value
in deciding on a proper course of economic action.153
150. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 10.
151. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 168; see also Nirmal Kumar Bose, The
Theory and Practice of Sarvodaya, in THE MEANINGS OF GANDHI 79 (Paul F.
Power ed., 1971).
152. BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 38 (1965).
153. Id.
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In MCWC, Michigan’s reasonable-use balancing test154
determines what constitutes “reasonable use” for an industry or
corporation when its imperatives are weighed against the needs
of local users and the ecosystem. Nestlé argued that its selling of
bottled water for profit-seeking use would result in the greatest
good for the greatest number. It is clear that Nestlé used an
explicit utilitarian calculus and even satisfied the expectation of
some utilitarian thinkers to quantify the greatest good, since one
could conceivably calculate the number of people receiving water
and compare it to the number that would not have received it.
Within utilitarian thinking, therefore, Nestlé can make such an
argument.
However, Nestlé can only make this argument because this
overtly utilitarian reasoning does not tackle the question of
whether want-regarding reasoning is justifiable in this instance.
If Nestlé can simply incorporate self-regarding behavior (profitseeking) into convenient want-regarding utilitarian reasoning,
then the corporation need not do anything except think about
what it wants. In sarvodaya, however, a party must consider the
welfare of all. As a result, Nestlé must consider the harm to the
riparian owners and include their loss into the calculus of the
greatest good. Furthermore, if we use sarvodaya as a starting
point, it is not sufficient for Nestlé to argue that people want the
bottled water because the ultimate question is what is in the
welfare of all, not whose view satisfies a greater good.155
Nestlé could argue that the welfare of all means the
willingness of the riparian owners to set aside their rights to
benefit all of Nestlé’s bottled water customers. However, Gandhi
saw the proper course of action in terms that lifted the dignity of
all parties involved, and he did not view rights in a purely
“either/or” confrontational fashion. As was true in his dealings
with the British Empire, it may have been tempting to view
Indian and British rights as absolutely in contrast; however, to
Gandhi, it was possible to achieve freedom for Indians and
simultaneously benefit the oppressor. In a similar spirit, the
question of Nestlé’s use of the waterway must include a calculus

154. Id.
155. See DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 168; Bose, supra note 151, at 80.
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of how the riparian owners would be benefitted, thus raising the
requirement of satisfying the “welfare of all” instead of assuming
that riparian rights must be sacrificed for a “greater good,” which
only one group allegedly possesses the power to exercise.
With their argument, Nestlé hides its self-interest in a
utilitarian garb. Nestlé argues for control over a large portion of
the water by including the use of its customers as a part of its
“corporate use.” The inclusion of customers can help Nestlé
achieve the “greatest number of people” qualification of
utilitarianism and can lead to a conclusion where the course of
action that benefits the most drinkers is the desirable conclusion.
However, this reasoning requires Nestlé’s control to extract,
bottle, and sell the water to the drinkers. Therefore, this
“greatest number of users” argument is a construction of the
social world that merely developed to satisfy Nestlé’s profitseeking motive.
The court repeatedly stated that Michigan courts have
purposefully avoided strict guidelines on this topic.156 Because
the court in MCWC did not list the factors in the reasonable-use
balancing test in any hierarchy of importance, its opinion
provides no clear guidance regarding how the several factors are
to be weighed. This lack of guidance allowed Nestlé to frame its
conduct as utilitarian and assume that solutions must be
competitive and interests must be contrasted to determine
reasonable use.
In contrast, if sarvodaya replaced utilitarian thinking, then a
hierarchy of importance could be based on a single “idealregarding” principle: parties are expected to develop a method of
action which will raise the welfare of all, not satisfy its own want.
This expectation forces parties to include an “other-regarding”
view of conflict in which persuasive arguments must be implicitly
and subtly collaborative. In other words, parties to a case
automatically become intellectual agents of non-harm, rather

156. Defendant’s Opposition Brief, supra note 39, at 29 (“Michigan has long
eschewed such rigid formulations, instead, adopting a reasonable use test,
allowing courts to ‘consider all the circumstances that are relevant in a given
case,’ 269 Mich. App at 55, in order to protect the environment, while at the
same time promoting socially and economically beneficial water uses.”); see also
Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
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than actors approaching a case in a pure “want-regarding”
fashion. Consequently, the reasonable-use balancing test differs
when “ideal-regarding” sarvodaya is used as a guiding principle
rather than “want-regarding” utilitarianism, and the Reasonable
Use Doctrine is fundamentally altered under a sarvodaya
standard.
b. “Significant Public Interest”
The court already seems to use reasoning similar to Gandhi’s
thought when it determined “significant public interest.” Both
the trial court and court of appeals reasoned that Nestlé’s
pumping created significant harm during the extraction
process.157 The court implicitly seems to consider ahimsa (nonharm) when evaluating the extraction process. Sarvodaya, like
other aspects of Gandhi’s thought, implicitly accepts ahimsa as a
guiding principle in determining the “welfare of all.” Therefore,
the court’s analysis of “significant public interest” already
contains within it a consideration of both ahimsa and sarvodaya.
C. Connecting Riparian Rights to Gandhi’s Theory of
Rights
There is no shortage of rights discourse in contemporary
legal and political theory, and Gandhi certainly participated in
discussions of rights. In his thought, rights are of paramount
importance, and the dignity of individuals and of oppressed
groups depends on the protection of such rights. However,
Gandhi seemed averse to the discussion of rights when the
discussion did not include an even greater emphasis on duty.
Gandhi’s theory of rights asserts that every right has a
corresponding duty, and it was the explication of duties that was
equally important–if not more important–than a declaration of
rights.158
157. Plaintiff's Application, supra note 45, at 8 (“The trial court and the Court
of Appeals both reached the factual conclusion that Nestlé’s removal of water
has caused and will cause substantial harm to the Dead Stream . . . and that
harm will be even greater at Nestle’s planned increased rate of pumping.”).
158. GANDHI, January 13, 1897 – July 11, 1902, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
MAHATMA GANDHI ONLINE, supra note 7, at 477 (“[A] consciousness that we are
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There are several ways that commentators perceive duty.
One of the most obvious is in the exercise of restraint to prevent
encroachment on the rights of others. In MCWC, for example,
one can think of a party as having a “right” to use the stream
water, which implies a duty among others not to interfere with
the party’s right of use. On the other hand, one can view “duty”
in the sense that the rights-holder also holds a duty to others to
not over-use or abuse his or her right to use the water. Still
others view a “duty” to the ecosystem, in the form of a
responsibility to protect the integrity of the ecosystem itself,
regardless of whether other human parties are directly and
adversely affected.159
In Gandhi’s thought, recognizing rights as universal moral
declarations is not the central issue as it is in many Western
conceptions of rights.160 To understand Gandhi’s theory of rights,
we must examine more deeply the differences between his worldview and the purely Western world-view. Gandhi saw the
realization of Truth, or self-realization, as life’s highest goal.
Rights, therefore, are relevant to life as opportunities for people
to further their own realization, not because they were
“discoveries” of fixed moral universals that support the rightsholder (and that other parties categorically are duty-bound to
follow in the purely Western conception).
Central to Gandhi’s process of self-realization is ahimsa,
commonly translated as non-violence, non-injury, or non-harm.
Gandhi described ahimsa as the vehicle, or mechanism, by which
a person can attain a full realization of Truth (satya).161 Because
non-injury is central to Gandhi’s conclusion of how Truth must be
attained, it is self-evident within his system of thought that duty
becomes more important to clarify than rights. The manner in
which we treat others–through the vehicle of non-injury–is
doing what we consider to be our duty to the best of our ability is the highest
reward.”); see also DASGUPTA, supra note 11, 44-63.
159. See ARNE NAESS, ECOLOGY, COMMUNITY AND LIFESTYLE: OUTLINE OF AN
ECOSOPHY (1989).
160. In addition, the power to hold and exercise a “right” does not validate
itself through rational deduction in Gandhi’s thought.
161. See GANDHI, supra note 6, at 463 (“[T]his much I can say with assurance,
as a result of all my experiments, that a perfect vision of Truth can only follow a
complete realization of Ahimsa.”).
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crucial to our own advancement toward self-realization. Duty,
therefore, is arguably the most important concept to clarify on the
path to enlightenment.162 In contrast, the connection between
rights and duties is not widely discussed in contemporary
Western social theory of rights, and even in Western law where
this connection has historically been discussed at length, duty
takes a back seat to rights in current legal discourse.163
In MCWC, riparian rights were at issue. Citizens’ riparian
right to the Dead Stream was in direct contrast to Nestlé’s
reasonable use of the groundwater by virtue of its payment of a
fee to the landowners. The struggle over Citizens’ riparian rights
and Nestlé’s “right” to reasonable use became a battle over the
meaning and application of the terms “on-tract” and “off-tract”
user. Citizens argued that its status as “on-tract” users allowed
its riparian rights to place boundaries around Nestlé’s “off-tract”
use of the groundwater.
In standard legal practice, it is common–and necessary–to
create arguments through the language of law. Both sides of this
case funneled their arguments deeply into technical language and
argued the meanings of that language. While Citizens argued
that Nestlé was an “off-tract” user, Nestlé argued they were “ontract users.” A legal formalist may view this argumentative
process in a generally positive light. In the process of debating
the meaning of the law’s language, some formalists may argue

162. Although the term “enlightenment” can carry several meanings in
various traditions, we understand Gandhi’s view of self-realization as being
parallel to Hindu and Buddhist views of moksha and nirvana, respectively.
Regardless of the conception of enlightenment, it is important to note that for
Gandhi, the fulfillment of “individual” self-realization and a more enlightened
social world went hand-in-hand; effectively, one necessarily followed from the
other.
Gandhi is credited with saying, “The difference between what we do and
what we are capable of doing would suffice to solve most of the world’s
problems.” Gandhi connected individual duty and social good through cause and
effect, explaining that if we all attend to our duties, then peace and a better
world will follow. DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 59 (“By exercising their rights
individuals are enabled to develop their own potential to the full and by doing so
contribute as best they can to the common good which it is their duty to do.”).
163. Incidentally, Dasgupta notes that law is the field of Gandhi’s formal
training, which perhaps explains why he focused his attention on duty.
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 53.
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that the law’s “deeper meanings” can be brought to light.164 In
this way of thinking, legal reasoning has the potential to unearth
profound themes embedded in the concepts of the law. However,
environmental law is especially wrought with technicalities so
detailed that it requires the input of scientists and engineers.
Even when viewed in a formalistic manner, it is difficult to see
how arguing the meaning of legal terms unearths any hidden
“deeper meanings” in the law. In MCWC, the legal arguments
analyzed the detail (even minutiae) of the language that
regulates property use.
Rather than unearthing “deeper
meanings” in the law, judges and lawyers focused on details that
impeded a discussion of the broader themes the case presented.
This case, like cases generally, became a battle over rights in
which the victorious party more successfully wove their rights
into the law’s language.
If one applies Gandhi’s theory of rights, one of the glaring
omissions in this case is the absence of any discussion of duty.
Under a duty-based theory of rights, a central question for the
court would be what reciprocal duties both parties have to one
another, and also what duties each party has to the environment.
Perhaps the strongest argument under this theory of rights lies
with Citizens: Nestlé owes a duty to use the water only in ways
that do not interfere with the riparian owners’ uses of the Dead
Stream. If Nestlé’s use interferes with riparian uses, then Nestlé
is not honoring its duty not to interfere with riparian uses.
Nestlé may also counter-argue that riparian owners may not
interfere with the corporation’s use of the groundwater; however,
other than the filing of the lawsuit itself, there is no evidence that
riparian owners interfered with Nestlé’s use of the water.
In a duty-based theory of rights, the duty to the environment
is a preexisting obligation for the right to use the land.165 In
164. Mark V. Tushnet, Critical Legal Theory, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 81 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005); see
also Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251
(1975). For a critique of formalism, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW (1963); see also JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND
CHANGE 137-42 (2001).
165. This construction of the relationship between duties and rights would be
central to a mindful jurisprudence of the environment that incorporates
Gandhi’s thought.
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MCWC, there is no evidence of the riparian owner’s over-use of
the Dead Stream. In contrast, there is ample concern of Nestlé’s
over-use of the groundwater and its effect on the ecosystem. The
trial court and court of appeals noted that Nestlé’s pumping
would cause “substantial harm to the dead stream”166 and also
the contiguous ecosystem.167
Therefore, in Gandhi’s theory of rights, there are heavy
burdens on Nestlé. Although the trial court ruled that riparian
rights outweighed Nestlé’s reasonable use, the dictum and the
briefs themselves contain an exclusive language of rights in
which the parties’ “rights” to “use” the water are placed in direct
competition with one another. In this highly individualistic
design of law, the self-interest involved in protecting rights at the
expense of others’ rights dominates the legal discourse. The
highly adversarial design of legal argumentation itself virtually
eliminated any opportunity to discuss duties in this case, and the
lawyers and judges seemed stuck in a discourse in which selfinterest is the “normal” foundation of legal reasoning. It is no
surprise, then, that parties argue their “rights” over the rights of
the opponent, and judges view the proper method of analyzing
rights purely in competitive and self-interested terms. As a
result, balancing tests require comparing rights, with no
assessment of duties.
In Gandhi’s thought, duties matter in legal analysis because
of its focus on responsibilities to others as a basis for peaceful
social relations. This “other-regarding” way of thinking is
disregarded in modern American jurisprudence for a “selfregarding” disposition, which we believe the MCWC case palpably
illustrates.168

166. See Plaintiff's Application, supra note 45, at 8 (“The trial court and the
Court of Appeals both reached the factual conclusion that Nestlé’s removal of
water has caused and will cause substantial harm to the Dead Stream . . . and
that harm will be even greater at Nestlé’s planned increased rate of pumping.”).
167. Id.
168. For a discussion of “self-regarding” versus “other-regarding” behavior, see
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 32.
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D. Connecting “Ecosystem Nexus” Theory to Gandhi’s
Critique of Industrialization
In a narrow legal sense, this dispute involves the plaintiff’s
riparian right to the reasonable use of the Dead Stream versus
Nestlé’s right to the reasonable use of groundwater from the land
it owns in fee simple.169 In a broader view, this case also
represents the struggles to either foster or contain industrial
development of pristine ecosystems, and in MCWC, the court
invoked the “ecosystem nexus theory” to determine the proper
balance between ecological preservation and industrial growth.
Gandhi left behind extensive commentary on the social
consequences of industrialization, and therefore, his thought has
much to contribute to understanding the implications of MCWC.
Evidence of Gandhi’s skepticism of modern industrialization
is legion. As the British Empire pushed to industrialize its
production processes, Gandhi warned against India following the
Empire’s lead. Commentators often interpreted his arguments
against industrialization in India as being based on moral
grounds. At times, his arguments were specific to India’s
national context in the twentieth century, and at other times,
Gandhi made broader sociological points that form a more
categorical rejection of industrialization. It is the latter which we
focus on here.
Gandhi made two arguments against industrialization that
we will apply to MCWC.
The first argument is that
industrialization, due to its heavy reliance on machinery, replaces
human labor rather than aiding it. Second, once industrialization
takes hold of an area, there is no limit to its encroachment.170
First, Gandhi argued that industrialization did not lead to
higher employment.171 Although many industrialists of his time
made the argument that machinery would create jobs, Gandhi
saw the trend in the opposite direction. Instead, machines
169. Nestlé further argued they are considered riparian users and not just
groundwater users because Nestlé purchased part of the land from the
Bollmans’. Citizens, 709 N.W.2d 174, 186 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
170. For a discussion of these two arguments, see DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at
71-76.
171. Mahatma Ghandi, Remarks to Manu Gandhi (Apr. 21, 1947), in
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 71.
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replaced human labor and provided no guarantee of replacing
people’s jobs. Work increasingly done by machines meant less
work available for humans. In MCWC, Nestlé built a plant solely
to extract water from the watershed. The inclusion of this
machinery into the area served no purpose but to accelerate
Nestlé’s water extraction and did not include any conceivable job
creation for local populations. Nestlé’s interest in implementing
the machinery into the watershed is so explicitly void of any local
benefit that the corporation itself did not even attempt to make
any such job-creation-based argument.
Second, Gandhi’s concern of machinery’s encroachment into
society parallels Citizens’ concern of machinery’s encroachment
into the ecosystem.
Gandhi especially condemned modern
industrial processes largely because of the manner in which they
concentrated wealth and power into the hands of elite oppressors.
He says “[o]rganization of machinery for the purposes of
concentrating wealth and power in the hands of a few and for the
exploitation of the many I would hold to be altogether wrong.
Much of the organization of machinery of the present age is of
that type.”172
Nestlé’s unprecedented ability to remove 150 gallons of water
per minute and 37.5% of the well’s total capacity173 from the
Dead Stream watershed presents a clear use of machinery used to
concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a few. With the
unparalleled ability to take water at such excessive rates, Nestlé
exercises the power to take and sell a resource necessary to the
integrity of the region for the purposes of expanding its own
market share. To take water to the point where the very
character of the ecosystem is jeopardized, furthermore, raises the
issue of exploitation of not only other riparian owners, but also of
the ecosystem itself and all human and non-human biotic life
depending on it.

172. Mahatma Ghandi, Remarks to “American friends” (Sept. 17, 1925), in
DASGUPTA, supra note 11, at 73.
173. Plaintiff's Application, supra note 45, at 4-5. The full capacity of the well
is 400 gallons of water per minute, 500,000 gallons per day, and 210 million
gallons per year. Id. at 2. The court reasoned that even at 37.5% capacity,
Nestlé’s pumping was unreasonable. Therefore, 100% capacity could result in
devastating ecosystemic consequences. Id. at 4-5.
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In MCWC, perhaps the most important check on exploitation
of a natural resource by an outside entity is the test that
determines “on-tract” vs. “off-tract” users. The reasonable use
doctrine contains a “fair participation” test that takes into
account whether the water being withdrawn is used on-tract or
off-tract.174 The court of appeals cited Schenk v. City of Ann
Arbor, in which there was a dispute between an on-tract user of
groundwater and a city that planned to pump groundwater offtract to meet municipal needs.175 The court uses the idea of
“material diminishment” in reasonable use, which means an offtract user could not cause an interference with an on-tract use.176
Schenk drew a distinction between on-tract and off-tract users,
which directly relates to reasonable use.177 By expecting users to
have an on-tract presence, the court implicitly provides a check
on industry’s encroachment onto–and potential exploitation of–
the environment and other users. Consequently, the court
connects the concern of preserving the “ecosystem nexus” with
the notion of fair participation, thus making the notion of fairness
and Gandhi’s concern of machinery’s encroachment on the
environment relevant to justifying further industrial development
of an ecosystem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Gandhi’s life and thought has deeply influenced millions of
people around the world, particularly regarding the struggles of
the oppressed and struggles to achieve social justice. His thought
has especially been used to achieve social change through civil
disobedience, peace, and non-violence.
Moreover, Gandhi’s
thought has been used to develop practical applications of
“alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) because many lawyers see
the resolution of conflict as one of law’s primary functions.
However, Gandhi’s thought has been lost to those who theorize
about jurisprudence. We argue that Gandhi’s thought contains
an intricate and comprehensive social theory that should inform
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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jurisprudence. This paper is our speculation on how Gandhi’s
thought connects to American environmental jurisprudence.
Modern law is often criticized for its narrow application of
specific legal principles at the expense of larger social
considerations.178
Especially in environmental law, court
decisions and legal briefs often dwell on technical details about
chemical concentrations or what constitutes a “discharge” of an
effluent. When dwelling on detail, it is easy for courts to stray
from the law’s broader initiatives and leave unaddressed the
central issues that exercise environmental policy, such as how to
conceptualize property rights and duties, conservation, and
beneficial versus consumptive use.
In MCWC, the parties invoke several key concepts of law,
including the Public Trust Doctrine, Reasonable Use Doctrine,
significant public interest, riparian rights, and ecosystem nexus.
We have examined these concepts as they may appear when one
considers relevant ideas from Gandhi’s thought–in particular his
theory of trusteeship, his theory of rights, sarvodaya, and his
critique of industrialization. In the process of invoking Gandhi’s
thought, we illustrate the inefficacy of certain arguments that are
otherwise viable under purely “western-based” approaches to the
same legal concepts. We believe that by examining the law from
this alternative perspective, we can provide a unique view of the
fundamental principles of environmental law and develop a
jurisprudence more mindful of encouraging responsibility (duties
of the wealthy as trustees), non-injury (ahimsa as a basis for
reasonable use and minimizing industrialization’s encroachment
on the environment), and overall welfare (sarvodaya). Gandhi’s
thought on these issues helps us speculate on what a
jurisprudence would look like that treats these principles as
meaningful social goals. We call such a legal theory a “mindful
jurisprudence.”
In this more mindful jurisprudence, the overuse of natural
resources is not only the state’s responsibility to monitor; it is the
178. See WOLCHER, supra note 34; see generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1996); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (2011); PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS:
LIBERATING AMERICANS FROM TOO MUCH LAW (2009).
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responsibility of all, especially those with the most wealth.
Because corporations are the wealthiest “people” in modern
societies, it would be an expectation that corporate use of wealth
must be guided by the view that their money is held in trust for
society’s benefit. Furthermore, rather than the equalization of
wealth being the only issue of social debate, the question of how
wealth is used would be a central question.
A mindful
jurisprudence would demand that corporations function as
society’s most important stewards, and valid legal arguments
would require corporate behavior in the welfare of all, not merely
the greatest number of people.
Furthermore, in a mindful jurisprudence, any discussion of
rights would begin with a question of what duty is owed. In
MCWC, both parties’ legal briefs immediately begin with
arguments for how one group’s rights outweigh the other group’s
rights. In a mindful jurisprudence, the main question for both
parties is what duty they owe to each other, or how their use will
not interfere with the other’s use. In this case, that question
applies entirely to Nestlé. The central burden for Nestlé is to
show how its right to use the water does not interfere with the
riparian owner’s use of the same resource. The courts already
seem to arrive at this line of reasoning and expect the parties to
fulfill the same duty that Gandhi’s thought would require.
However, to extend Gandhi’s theory of rights farther, a mindful
jurisprudence would contain within it the expectation that Nestlé
also must focus its attention on its duty to the ecosystem in order
to create a successful argument for its own “right” to use the
water.
A preoccupation with “rights” without a well-developed
consideration of duty can become purely self-regarding and easily
disregard the needs of others, whereas a focus on duty is an easy
consequence of the “other-regarding” thought that is mindful of
the needs of others. In Gandhi’s thought, duty is central to rights
and the most important concept in any discussion of “rights”
because the way we regard others is crucial to our own selfrealization. According to Gandhi, moksha–life’s highest goal in
most branches of Indian philosophy–can only be achieved through
ahimsa. Therefore, ahimsa is not only a primary policy of law;
rather, it is the mechanism to attain a more enlightened way of
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living and situates legal thought into a world-view based on noninjury.
Finally, a mindful jurisprudence would require the debate
about reasonable use to invoke sarvodaya rather than
utilitarianism. The court seriously entertains Nestlé’s utilitarian
argument even though Nestlé presents no plan to uplift the
riparian owners along with its own profit.
In a mindful
jurisprudence, it would be implicit that Nestlé must show how its
water extraction uplifts the welfare of all–including the welfare of
the riparian owners. The fact that this perspective is nonexistent in the case only underscores the need for an alternative
to utilitarian reasoning.
Our contemporary environmental discourse is full of many
cries that the earth is dying. Whether we examine the dire
consequences from climate change, pollution, or biodiversity loss,
it is clear that revolutionary new thinking is needed to
immediately combat the perils of modern environmental
problems.
Gandhi is one of the twentieth century’s most
recognizable critics of modern development, and his critique of
the modern notion of “progress” is as important now as it ever has
been. Gandhi’s thought contains the promise of an invigorating
discussion on the problems that ail us and the planet. Whether
our legal community listens–and whether jurisprudence will meet
modern environmental challenges–is not a question that time will
permit.
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